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I. INTRODUCTION
Life inside the prison gates possesses its own set of unique security needs,
which can 'determine the total existence of certain human beings."" However,
'prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution."' 2 This Comment focuses on the dilemma created
when prison officials, in the name of security, deprive prisoners of the right to
choose what religious materials they need to practice their faith by creating
exclusive approved religious book lists.' This denial may seem de minimis4 in
view of the fact that prisoners are already told when to wake, retire, and eat, are
prohibited from embracing their spouses, and are forced to submit to oral and
anal searches.5 These normally unconstitutional deprivations are permitted
because '"[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights"' in the name of "valid penological
objectives," such as security. 6
Prison officials have the "often thankless job of preserving security in a
potentially explosive setting."7 This duty does not, however, permit the
imposition of unlimited regulations and deprivations in the name of security,
especially when constitutional rights are at issue.8 Accordingly, when examining
the legality of prison regulations, courts strike a balance between the security
1. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (quoting Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550
(W.D. Wis. 1972)); accord In the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice in Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1891,
1891 (2002) [hereinafter Religious Practices in Prison] ("Prisons are closely regulated environments in which
uniformity of schedule, appearance, and diet are, for reasons of security and economy, high priorities.").
2. Anna C. Bums, Comment, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading, Rehabilitation, and Prisoners' First
Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1225, 1239 (2007) (quoting the opinion of Justice O'Connor in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)).
3. See generally Kelly Gower, Religious Practice in Prison & The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA): Strict Scrutiny Properly Restored, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 7
(2004) (describing the tension between balancing inmates' religious claims and security concerns in prison).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004) (defining de minimis as "[t]rifling; minimal" or "so
insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case").
5. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 355 (citing Morales, 340 F. Supp. at 550).
6. Id. at 348 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
7. Id. at 355.
8. See id. ("[Pirisoners retain constitutional rights that limit the exercise of official authority against
them." (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979))).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40
needs of prisons and the mandates of the Constitution. 9 Attempts to standardize
the religious materials in prison chapel libraries through the creation of approved
book lists invoke this balancing test.
A. The Standardized Chapel Library Project
During the months of August and September 2007, reports surfaced about the
Department of Justice's (DOJ) attempt to standardize prison chapel libraries.'0
The stated purpose of this effort, which the DOJ termed the "Standardized
Chapel Library Project" (SCLP), was to limit access to materials that could
'discriminate, disparage, advocate violence or radicalize."'. A spokeswoman
for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a subsidiary of the DOJ, stated that the project
was motivated by the need to provide "consistently available information for all
religious groups to assure reliable teachings as determined by reliable subject
experts."' 2 The BOP enacted the program by purging chapel libraries of
numerous religious books and materials that were not on an approved list of
religious resources."
The BOP's original intention for the list was to create an inventory of all
materials in chapel libraries to determine which resources might incite violence.'
4
However, the BOP abandoned this task when the list grew to "tens of thousands,"
and the BOP decided that the project was too unmanageable.' 5 Instead, the BOP
decided to create a shorter approved religious materials list.' 6 The list stipulated
what books and resources were allowed in prison chapel libraries for each of the
twenty 7 religions listed.' To create the list of approved religious materials, the
BOP enlisted the aid of undisclosed religious experts to produce a list of up to
150 books and 150 multimedia resources for each of the twenty religions.'9
9. See Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again? Legislative Responses to
City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2334 (1998) ("[Clourts have balanced prisoner rights
against the penological interests of prison administration.").
10. 2 New York Prisoners Sue to Get Their Banned Religious Books Back, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug.
22, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=7221501 [hereinafter New York Prisoners] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); Laurie Goodstein, Prisons Purging Books on Faith from Libraries, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, http:llwww.nytimes.comV2007/09/10/us/lOprison.html?_r=2&pagewanted=l&oref=
slogin# [hereinafter Goodstein, Purging] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Laurie Goodstein, Critics
Right and Left Protest Book Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/
us/21prison.html [hereinafter Goodstein, Critics] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10 (quoting Traci Billingsley, spokeswoman for the BOP).
12. Id.
13. See id. (stating that prison chaplains were instructed by the BOP to remove unapproved materials).
14. Neela Banerjee, Prisons to Restore Purged Religious Books, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/washington/27prison.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. Id.
16. Goodstein, Critics, supra note 10 (discussing criticism of the BOP's use of approved religious book
lists).
17. Religious Practices in Prison, supra note 1, at 1900 (describing the findings of a widely-regarded
prison chaplaincy handbook, which lists the average number of religious groups at around twenty).
18. Goodstein, Critics, supra note 10.
19. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10.
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A 2004 report from the Office of the Inspector General in the DOJ warned
that because most prisons do not catalog their library materials, "radical books
that incite violence and hatred could infiltrate the shelves."20  This report
influenced the BOP to institute the SCLP.2' The report was a direct response to
the concern that prisons had not examined the content of chapel libraries since
the September 1 1th attacks.2  In response, the DOJ advised prisons to take
23
measures to avoid becoming recruiting grounds for militant religious groups.
When instituted, the project had sweeping effects. In some libraries, only a
few books remained after all of the non-approved materials were taken off of the
shelves.24 In other prisons, the Muslim portion of the library was reduced to the
Qur'an25 and two other titles, but failed to include other important prayer guides
such as the Hadith.26
In response to the SCLP, some prisoners filed a class action lawsuit alleging
that the program violates the First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion.27 Perhaps due to the combination of the threat of legal action and
overwhelming criticism from the general public, the BOP decided to temporarily
postpone the SCLP and return the banned books.2' However, a spokeswoman for
the BOP insisted that the Bureau had not abandoned its efforts to create approved
religious book lists for prison chapel libraries, but had decided to allow the books
to remain on the shelves while those lists were compiled.2 9
20. Goodstein, Critics, supra note 10.
21. Id.
22. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS' SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 55 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reviewing the
"recruitment, application process, and security screening" of religious service providers once they are "allowed
into BOP correctional institutions"); see also Stephen Seymour, Comment, The Silence of Prayer: An
Examination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Moratorium on the Hiring of Muslim Chaplains, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 523, 523 (2006) (The report also states that a review of prisons should be conducted due to
"concern that Islamic terrorists may be recruiting from the Muslim population in federal and state prisons").
23. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10.
24. Goodstein, Critics, supra note 10.
25. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, Qur'an, available at http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/koran (last visited Dec. 10, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining the Qur'an
as "the book composed of sacred writings accepted by Muslims as revelations made to Muhammad by Allah
through the angel Gabriel").
26. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, Hadith, available at http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/Hadith (last visited Dec. 30, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining the
Hadith as "a narrative record of the sayings or customs of Muhammad and his companions"); see New York
Prisoners, supra note 10 (describing a lawsuit brought by two New York inmates challenging the removal of
the religious books from the prison library).
27. New York Prisoners, supra note 10.
28. Banerjee, supra note 14.
29. Id.
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B. Scope and Structure of Analysis
The DOJ's Standardized Chapel Library Project is one example of how the
Government might attempt to standardize the religious content of prison chapel
libraries. In anticipation of additional standardization projects by the DOJ, this
Comment explores the legality of the general use of approved religious book lists
in prisons.
This Comment argues that the balancing act between prison security interests
and protection of prisoners' rights tips in favor of the rights of prisoners when
approved religious book lists are utilized. In the context of restricted book lists,
however, the scale would tip in favor of deferring to the security interests of
prisons. Although there are many different legal theories through which the use
of approved versus restricted religious materials lists could be analyzed, this
Comment primarily focuses on two legal tests: the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) ° and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.3'
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the legal battle for religious
rights in prisons. Part III examines approved versus restricted religious books
lists under RLUIPA. Part IV analyzes approved versus restricted religious books
lists under the Establishment Clause. Part V considers the free speech
requirements of restricted religious books lists. Finally, Part VI concludes that
the DOJ's attempt to standardize prison chapel libraries by creating an approved
religious book list is unlikely to survive legal challenges under either RLUIPA or
the Establishment Clause. Instead, a restricted religious book list is a more viable
alternative than an approved religious book list, as long as the government
adequately limits the restrictions to those books that can reasonably be shown to
promote violence.
II. JURISPRUDENCE OF PRISONERS' RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
A. Courts' Deference to Prison Officials
Before 1960, deciding between protecting the religious rights of prisoners
and upholding a prison's need for security was not an issue-a convicted
criminal was considered to be a "slave of the State.3 During this period, courts
refused to elevate the rights of prisoners above the high level of deference
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... ").
32. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (1 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871); see also Christopher E. Smith, Black
Muslims and the Development of Prisoners' Rights, 24 J. BLACK STUD. 131, 131 n.2 (1993) ("Judges avoided
deciding cases concerning prisoners by saying that convicted criminals were 'slave[s]' of the state."); Religious
Practices in Prison, supra note 1, at 1893 (explaining the previously common approach by courts to consider
prisoners as slaves of the state).
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normally given to decisions of prison officials.33 Despite the widely held modem
belief that prisoners have enforceable constitutional rights, the previous stance of
courts was that "[n]o romantic or sentimental view of constitutional rights or of
religion should induce a court to interfere with the necessary disciplinary regime
established by the prison officials." The security needs of prisons prevailed over
any rights that a prisoner might assert, and courts went as far as stating that a
"prisoner retained only such rights as were not inconsistent with prison
discipline."35
When the Supreme Court first took up the issue of prisoners' First
Amendment rights, it expressed hesitation about interfering with prison
administration.36 In Procunier v. Martinez,37 however, the Court described some
circumstances when the rights of prisoners should prevail. These circumstances
included situations when there was no substantial governmental interest or the
means employed were not "necessary or essential" to the protection of the stated
interest.3' The Court later added the "availability of alternatives" as a factor to
this analysis.39
In Turner v. Safley,4° this framework shifted significantly, resulting in a new
test. The Supreme Court held that restrictions on prisoners' constitutional rights
need only be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 4' The Court
made this determination by looking at four factors: (1) "a 'valid, rational
connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest"; (2) "alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates"; (3) the burden imposed on the prison if forced to provide the freedom;
and (4) the existence of less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same
objective.42 After reviewing these factors, some believe that the Turner test can
33. See Braunstein, supra note 9, at 2334 (discussing four legislative proposals that were intended "to
supply much needed free exercise protection to religious groups").
34. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir. 1964) (involving an action by inmates of a state
prison alleging interference with their rights to practice the Muslim religion).
35. W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Provision of Religious Facilities for Prisoners, 12 A.L.R. 3D 1276 § 3
(1967) (citing Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965)).
36. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (dealing with censorship of inmate
correspondence).
37. Id.
38. Burns, supra note 2, at 1239.
39. See id. at 1232-38 (explaining that Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) was the first to add the
availability of alternatives factor and how a string of Supreme Court cases found that "if a restriction is
necessary and essential to protect penological interests, it may be deemed valid even if no alternative means of
expression are available").
40. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (involving a claim regarding a prisoner's right to conduct correspondence and
marry that implicated the balancing test between prisoners' constitutional rights and the need to maintain
security).
41. Id. at 89.
42. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586
(1987)); see also Burns, supra note 2, at 1239-40 (describing the application of each of the four factors).
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be applied with too much deference in favor of prison administration. Justice
Stevens expressed this concern in his dissent when he argued that the standard set
forth was meaningless, would legitimize imaginary security concerns, and would
allow for "far reaching anticipatory restrictions."" The Turner test's broad
deference to prison officials may have led to the subsequent legislative attempts
to protect the religious rights of prisoners.
B. Statutory Attempts to Protect Prisoners' Religious Rights
1. Lead up to RLUIPA
In addition to the broad discretion given to prison officials by Turner,
Congress attempted to protect the religious rights of prisoners in response to
Employment Division v. Smith." Smith stated that laws of general applicability,
which do not specifically target religion, are not subject to strict scrutiny
46
standards. In response to Smith, Congress embarked on an attempt to create a
statute that would "restore the compelling interest test" and "guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened., 47 Congress attempted three times to create such a statute before it
finally enacted one that withstood legal challenges.4 s Congress' first attempt, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,49 was found unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, 50 and its second attempt, the Religious Liberty Protection Act,5' only
43. See id. at 1252 (arguing that the Supreme Court, in Beard applied the Turner test too deferentially
and failed to "truly scrutinize the restrictions under the third and fourth prongs," which resulted in "something
more akin to automatic deference than judicial review").
44. Id. at 1243.
45. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denying members of the
Native American Church unemployment benefits for using peyote during a religious ceremony).
46. Christina H. Schnizler, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
and its Effect on Eleventh Circuit Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1261, 1263 (2006); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating that for infringements on First Amendment rights, there must be a compelling
interest rather than a mere "rational relationship to some colorable state interest").
47. Gower, supra note 3 at 13; see also 139 Cong. Rec. H2359 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Nadler) (arguing that the proposed legislation would overturn the Supreme Court's "disastrous decision"
in Snith, "which virtually eliminated the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion").
48. Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1262 (explaining how RLUIPA was Congress' third attempt "to
strengthen religious liberty rights in its battle with the Supreme Court over the content of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses").
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bbl-4 (1993) (reinstating strict scrutiny standards for laws that generally and
individually burdened religious practices of institutionalized persons and land use provisions).
50. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
unconstitutional for violating separation of powers principals and that Congress exceeded its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998) (providing that "a government shall not substantially burden a
person's religious exercise-(1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that receives Federal
financial assistance").
809
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passed the House of Representatives. 2 Finally, Congress succeeded with its third
attempt, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
2. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
Not only did Congress achieve its goal in enacting a religious freedom statute
that passed constitutional muster, but Congress also succeeded by including a
compelling interest test in the statute. The RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 and
states in part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
54
Because the authority for RLUIPA derives from the Commerce Clause55 of the
Constitution, it applies to all prisons that receive any amount of federal funding.56
RLUIPA provides for a strict scrutiny review of prison regulations that infringe
upon prisoners' First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion.57 The statute
is a major victory for prisoners whose constitutional claims were previously
governed by the highly deferential Turner test, which only required restrictions
on the exercise of religion to be "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."58
The Supreme Court approved RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkinson against an
Establishment Clause challenge.59 Although RLUIPA has given prisoners a very
useful tool for defending their right to practice a particular faith, prisoners must
still overcome some hurdles before they can successfully challenge prison
procedures under the RLUIPA. For instance, the plaintiff must prove that there is
52. See Benjamin S. Fischer, Note, Power to the Prisoner: The Importance of State Religious Freedom
Acts in Preserving the Religious Liberties of Prisoners, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 233, 251-52 (2001) (explaining how
RLUIPA was found to be overly broad).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5.
54. Id. §2000cc- 1.
55. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
56. See Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1267 ("RLUIPA applies only to the extent of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause.").
57. The statute provides for a strict scrutiny standard of review for land use provisions in addition to
prison regulations that limit prisoners' First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion.
58. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
59. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (finding that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment
Clause since it did not impermissibly advance religion by differentiating between religious faiths or advancing
religion over the need to maintain security, but limiting its holding to RLUIPA's institutionalized persons
provisions, not its land use provisions).
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a substantial burden on an actual religious belief.60 In other words, the plaintiff
must prove that the burden is more than a mere inconvenience to a practice based
on "sincerely held religious beliefs.'
III. APPROVED VERSUS RESTRICTED BOOK LISTS UNDER RLUIPA
A. Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise
Courts tend to focus on whether a restriction constitutes a substantial burden
rather than on whether the activity qualifies as a religious exercise. 62 In fact,
courts oftentimes go directly to the substantial burden inquiry without even
addressing whether the exercise is religious in nature. 6' As long as the activity has
even a minimal religious foundation, courts will likely consider it to be a
religious exercise.' 4 The statute defines the term "religious exercise" as including
"any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief., 65 Therefore, because the materials being regulated by both
restricted and approved book lists are religious ones, the use of these materials
will most likely constitute a religious exercise in the eyes of a court.
The real inquiry under this element of an RLUIPA claim is whether
forbidding the use of certain religious materials constitutes a substantial burden.66
A regulation constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise when it causes
the prisoner to alter his or her behavior in a way that violates a sincerely held
belief.
67
According to these standards, the imposition of an approved religious book
list could constitute a substantial burden, as demonstrated in Marria v.
Broaddus.68 In Marria, a New York federal district court found that a prison
regulation banning a religious newspaper substantially burdened prisoners'
60. Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1268 ("[A] plaintiff must first show that the regulation imposes a
substantial burden on the plaintiffs religious exercise.").
61. Id. at 1285.
62. See id. at 1284 (explaining how courts easily accept grooming habits, eating habits, and attending
religious services as religious exercises without much, if any, inquiry).
63. See id. at 1286 (discussing how the court in Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (E.D.
Cal. 2004), ignored the question of whether maintaining a beard as prescribed by the Muslim religion was a
religious exercise and moved directly to the question of whether the prison regulation was a substantial burden
on this exercise).
64. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating an example of when a court skipped analyzing whether an activity is a
religious exercise, and instead only considered whether there was a substantial burden).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2006).
66. Christine M. Peluso, Congressional Intent v. Judicial Reality: The Practical Effects of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 5, 17 (2004) ("[A] clear
understanding of the term 'substantial burden' is crucial to a correct application of RLUIPA since this inquiry is
the threshold that a plaintiff must cross.").
67. Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1286 (2006); see also C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903,
914 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("A substantial burden exists when the government pressures a plaintiff to modify her
behavior and violate her beliefs, by, for example .... pressuring her to forgo a religious practice.").
68. 200 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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exercise of religion under RLUIPA. 69 The court ruled that the plaintiff
successfully demonstrated a substantial burden because the newspaper was "an
integral part of the daily practice" of the plaintiff's religion.70 Therefore, an
approved or restricted book list that deprives a prisoner of religious material
similar to the one involved in Marria presents a substantial burden under
RLUIPA analysis.
Although this Comment cannot provide a full list of potentially relevant
religions, it is foreseeable that a broad spectrum of religions could require the use
of religious materials or texts that are not on an approved list, or are included on
a restricted list.7 2 Without these materials, a prisoner would be forced to alter his
or her behavior by using a different or less effective text, or even stopping the
practice altogether, if no suitable alternative is provided for by the approved or
restricted list. This effect on a prisoner's practice of his or her religion would
therefore constitute a substantial burden, as it would alter a prisoner's behavior in
a way that would violate a religious belief.
73
Depriving a prisoner of a religious text needed to practice his or her chosen
faith can ultimately constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA for both
approved and restricted book lists.74 Although both lists create this burden,
however, an approved book list will involve more burdens than a restricted book
list, especially if the approved book list consists of only twenty religions, like the
SCLP.75 A restricted book list is exclusive and burdens only those books on the
list. An approved list is inclusive and burdens all religions and books not on the
list. The approved lists will inevitably invoke more burdens than an exclusive
restricted book list.
B. Compelling Governmental Interest
Prison safety is regularly found to constitute a compelling governmental
interest. 76 As long as the purpose behind approved or restricted book lists is a
genuine safety concern, it would surely seem that this element of an RLUIPA
claim would be met. However, the weight afforded to consideration of the safety
69. Id.
70. Id. at 298.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., id. at 280 (holding that a prison regulation forbidding the possession of a religious
magazine, The Five Percenter, was a substantial burden to the plaintiff's religious exercise and an RLUIPA
violation). Cf Religion Practice in Prison, supra note 1, at 1891 ("Sacred objects, such as texts ... are an
integral part of many religions.").
73. Cf The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 831 (1977) ("The study of
religious literature is important to most faiths.").
74. Cf Religion Practice in Prison, supra note 1, at 1891 (explaining how methods of classification that
consolidate or otherwise limit religious choices "restrict an inmate's free exercise of religion").
75. The fact that states such as Texas list as many as 144 distinct religious classifications shows how
approved lists enumerating only twenty or so religions are under inclusive and therefore more burdensome. See
id. at 1900 (explaining how Texas lists the most faith groups).
76. Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 2006) ("An interest in curtailing violence within
prison walls is compelling.").
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interest may be diminished if it is based on mere suspicion of violence without
more.77 Some courts have allowed hypothetical safety concerns to suffice when
they are combined with other legitimate compelling governmental interests, suchS 71
as lack of resources or funding. Without these additional interests, prison
officials would automatically have a compelling interest by merely stating an
unfounded or illusory safety concern.79
The existence of a compelling safety interest behind a restricted or approved
religious book list depends upon one of two factors: (1) a valid foundation for the
safety concerns based on more than mere suspicion of violence; 0 or (2) a weaker
safety concern combined with legitimate financial concerns, such as a lack of
funding and resources."
A restricted book list would more easily satisfy these two factors and provide
a more compelling governmental interest than an approved list. The safety
interest behind an approved religious book list is based merely upon "a potential
for violence" if no concrete basis for the prison's safety concerns can be provided
for each book left off the list.s2 Due to the sheer number of religious books that
will inevitably be left off of an enumerated list and the inability to extrapolate a
safety concern for each book, an approved list's potential for violence constitutes
an illusory interest that likely will not satisfy RLUIPA's compelling interest
requirement."
An approved list also fails to fulfill the second option listed above for
compelling interests under RLUIPA because there are no additional interests to
support an approved book list's illusory safety interest.4 If anything, prisons will
need additional funding to support an approved book list, since, as stated above,
77. See Sarah E. Vallely, Comment, Criminals Are all the Same: Why Courts Need to Hold Prison
Officials Accountable for Religious Discrimination Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 227 (2007) (stating that "mere suspicion of violence was not itself a compelling
interest absent proof of violent occurrences"); see also Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1289 ("The threat of racial
violence is of course a valid security concern, but to satisfy RLUIPA's higher standard of review, prison
authorities must provide some basis for their concern.").
78. See Vallely, supra note 77, at 227 ("[Even though] prison officials may not be able to show that their
religious policies are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest merely by
allegations of violence, providing exacerbating factors based on lack of prison resources will likely tip the court
in the prison's favor.").
79. See Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1287 ("[A]n institution will almost always put forth safety concerns
as its compelling interest.").
80. See Vallely, supra note 77, at 227 (explaining how mere suspicion of violence is not a compelling
interest).
81. See id. (noting that weak safety concerns constitute a compelling interest when combined with other
concerns, such as resources or funding). Cf Gower, supra note 3, at 38 ('Congress has chosen to raise the bar
for prison administrators when it comes to the balancing of security and resource concerns against the rights of
institutionalized persons to practice their faith."' (quoting Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 951 (W.D.
Wis. 2002))).
82. Vallely, supra note 77, at 229 (stating that the potential for violence is not enough to overcome
RLUIPA's strict scrutiny standards).
83. Id. ("[M]erely alleging a potential for violence ... is not enough to overcome strict scrutiny
review.").
84. Id. (explaining how the compelling interest threshold may be met by "additional factors such as lack
of resources to contain potential violence").
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several prison libraries' shelves were left nearly empty after all of the non-
approved items were removed.85 Thus, funding would have to be provided to
restock the chapel libraries with the approved materials.86 Ultimately, the
government will not be able to claim an additional compelling financial interest
to support its stated safety interest for an approved list, since additional funding
and resources will likely be needed to support the program anyway."
A restricted list is more likely to serve a compelling governmental interest
because it would be relatively easy for the government to show that enumerated
banned items on a restricted list are likely to incite violence, thus facilitating the
government's burden. Even demonstrating that the banned books "promote
violence as an acceptabie way of advancing ... beliefs" would fulfill RLUIPA's
compelling safety interest requirement under Borzych v. Frank.88  The
Government could also make the argument that, in addition to the safety interest,
resources are being saved because removing these items will create more shelf
space in already crowded prisons. 8
C. Least Restrictive Means
One of the strongest arguments in favor of a restricted book list is found in
RLUIPA's least restrictive means requirement, which mandates that any burden
upon religious exercise be "the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest. ' 9" Under RLUIPA, courts tend to strictly
analyze whether prison regulations are the least restrictive means of attaining the
prison's legitimate interest. 9' It is therefore unlikely that a regulation that removes
an abnormally large number of books without regard to whether they incite
violence would be sufficiently tailored to constitute the least restrictive means
available. Under this element, "prisons must show they have considered more
than one alternative to allow the inmate to practice his religion. 92 Even if the
Government can show that it considered some option other than an approved
85. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10 (discussing how after the non-approved books were taken off of
the shelves, only a few items remained).
86. Id. ("The bureau has not provided additional money to prisons to buy the books on the lists, so in
some prisons, after the shelves were cleared of books not on the lists, few remained."). This Comment presumes
that prisons will incur additional expenses because they will choose to restock the shelves with approved books,
rather than let the shelves remain bare, leaving the prisoners with very little, if any, religious materials.
87. Cf Gower, supra note 3, at 39 ("No longer can prison administrators merely cite security and
budgetary concerns to immediately quash any inquiry concerning inmates' religious rights. Prison
administrators occupy powerful positions within our society and RLUIPA requires their accountability.").
88. 439 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a prison regulation banning three religious books that
"as a whole promote violence as an acceptable way of advancing racist beliefs" against an RLUIPA challenge).
89. See Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (involving a RLUIPA claim where a prison
regulation limiting the amount of religious items a prisoner could keep was supported by a compelling interest
of preventing overcrowding, however, the regulation was later held invalid for not using the least restrictive
means).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006).
91. Schnizler, supra note 46, at 1289.
92. Id.
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book list for preventing violence, RLUIPA requires more of an effort.93 If the
Government's interest in using such a list is truly to prevent violence, then a
restricted list would be a less restrictive option. With a restricted list, only those
books that tend to promote violence would be banned, rather than all books not
on an approved list.
94
D. Result: A Restricted Book List Will More Easily Pass RLUIPA Requirements
than an Approved Book List
There are several reasons why a restricted book list passes RLUIPA
requirements more easily than an approved list. First, an approved book list will
likely give rise to more prisoner claims for substantial burdens on religious
exercises due to the sheer number of books and materials that will inevitably be
left off of an enumerated list. Most likely, the number of books left off of an
approved book list will be greater than the number listed on a restricted book list
composed of only those books that tend to incite violence.9 Secondly, an
approved list is unlikely to serve a compelling governmental interest because it
probably cannot be shown that all of the books left off of the list tend to promote
violence. Not only is it possible to demonstrate that all of the banned items on a
restricted list promote violence, but there may also be additional interests
supporting a restricted list, such as preventing overcrowding in prison libraries
without incurring additional financial burdens. 96 Unlike an approved book list, a
restricted book list passes the least restrictive means test, as it is narrowly tailored
to include only those books that promote violence. If the Government desires to
institute a program that will fulfill its security interests and overcome RLUIPA
challenges, it should utilize a restricted book list rather than an approved one.
IV. APPROVED VERSUS RESTRICTED BOOK LISTS UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The remedy for an RLUIPA violation only lifts the harm from the individual
plaintiff by restoring the requested book or books to the library.97 Thus, an
93. See Spratt v. R.I. Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33 (lst Cir. 2007) (involving an RLUIPA claim where
blanket statements about alternative means did not suffice since the officials were required to explain why
alternative policies would be infeasible or would constitute less effective security measures).
94. See Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that vague or unspecific standards,
such as a "prison's attempt to exclude all literature that 'advocates racial or ethnic supremacy[,]' would be hard
to sustain against a challenge under RLUIPA"). Therefore, the lack of any standards with approved lists would
inevitably cause the program to fail under RLUIPA.
95. This Comment assumes this fact due to the vast number of books on religious topics that exist.
96. This Comment recognizes the fact that both restricted and approved lists serve the additional
function of preventing overcrowding in prison libraries. However, only restricted lists serve this function
without incurring additional burdens, such as requiring additional funding to restock library shelves.
97. See Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130-31 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[A]ppropriate relief ordinarily
includes injunctive and declaratory relief." (internal quotations omitted)).
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RLUIPA claim cannot be used to invalidate an entire program." A program can
be invalidated, however, by showing an Establishment Clause violation.9
Remedies under an Establishment Clause violation are much more powerful.1'
The clause limits the power of the government and "works to roll back entirely
the actions of the government which [are] exceeding its jurisdiction."'0 '
A. Choosing a Test
"One of the few things constitutional scholars of every stripe seem to agree
about is the proposition that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an
incoherent mess."'' 2 There is no "Grand Unified Theory" of the Establishment
Clause, as Justice O'Connor explained.' 3 Instead, Establishment Clause doctrines
are "context-dependant" and "driven by the facts of each case.
'' °
B. The Lemon Test
Lemon v. Kurtzman articulates the traditional Establishment Clause test.u"° In
Lemon, the Supreme Court held that a governmental regulation must (1) have a
secular legislative purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.'06 The Court moved away from this test in certain
situations where it did not consider the Lemon test to be a perfect fit. °7
Stemming from the original Lemon factors, at least three tests have prevailed
as useful tools for examining Establishment Clause violations: the endorsement
98. Borzych, 439 F.3d at 391 (explaining how RLUIPA neither "requires (nor permits) courts to nullify
whole regulations").
99. Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing
the Supreme Court's Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 364 (2007) (holding that the remedy awarded for an
Establishment Clause violation was an order enjoining the religious exercise of reciting the Lord's Prayer in a
public school).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 364-65 (explaining how the Free Exercise Clause confers rights that vest in religious
individuals while the Establishment Clause limits the government's "power to legislate on matters more
properly within the purview of organized religion").
102. Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. I, 4 (2006); see also
William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and
Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2002) ("[T]here is no underlying theory
of religious freedom that has captured a majority of the Court, and the Court's commitment to its announced
doctrines is tenuous at best.").
103. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (describing the appeal and desire of a single, unifying test).
104. Marci A. Hamilton, The Establishment Clause During the 2004 Term: Big Cases, Little Movement,
2004-05 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 159, 184 (2004).
105. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
106. Id. at 612-13.
107. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (stating that the appropriate test is "what viewers may fairly
understand to be the purpose of the display").
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test, the altered Lemon test, and the coercion test. °s These are the three most
commonly used Establishment Clause tests. 9 The endorsement test is "the
Supreme Court's preeminent means for analyzing the constitutionality of
religious symbols and expression on public property," and, as such, is not useful
for non-displays, such as book list programs. °"0 The Supreme Court explained that
its preference for the endorsement test over Lemon was due to the fact that
Lemon was not helpful in assessing passive religious monuments."' Thus, since
the creation of book lists involves "active decision-making," rather than passive
monuments, a Lemon-like analysis is appropriate."2 In addition to a Lemon-like
analysis, it is also useful to analyze a restricted book list under the coercion test.
C. Altered Lemon Test
The Lemon test is the preeminent Establishment Clause test, as shown by the
fact that "nearly all Establishment Clause analysis begins with Lemon.""' 3
However, the Supreme Court has altered Lemon since it first used the three-part
test in 197 1."14 The first prong, having a secular legislative purpose, has remained
virtually the same."5 However, the Supreme Court has combined the second and
third prongs of the Lemon test, as they "often call for distinctions that are too
ambiguous to support a consistent constitutional jurisprudence."'16
108. Richard R. W. Fields, Comment, Perks for Prisoners Who Pray: Using the Coercion Test to Decide
Establishment Clause Challenges to Faith-Based Prison Units, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 541, 549 (2005)
("[T]here are three tests that have garnered majority support in evaluating Establishment Clause claims: the
Agostini-Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test. All three tests are used by courts today.").
109. DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 113 (2003).
110. PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS' TORTUOUS TREATMENT OF RELIGION
57 (2006); see also Tim Eicher, Comment, Scaling the Wall: Faith-Based Prison Programs and the
Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 221, 233 (2007) ("Some courts have questioned the validity of
using only endorsement as the analytical framework for Establishment Clause cases, except in the 'unique and
discrete circumstances' of public religious symbols and displays." (quoting DeStefano v. Emergency Housing
Co., 247 F.3d 397, 410-11 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
111. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 685, 686 (2005).
112. Sarah Hodgson, Comment, The Other Side of the Wall: The Free Exercise and Establishment of
Religion in Prisons, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 315, 326 (2005).
113. Fields, supra note 108, at 554; see also Frank J. Ducoat, Comment, Inconsistent Guideposts: Van
Orden, McCreary County, and the Continuing Need for a Single and Predictable Establishment Clause Test, 8
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 14, 15 (2007) ("tT]he Lemon test is the most used and most criticized of all the
existing standards by which Establishment Clause cases are decided.").
114. Fields, supra note 108, at 549 (explaining how the Supreme Court modified Lemon in Agostini v.
Felton by "formally not[ing] the overlap between the second and third prongs of the Lemon test").
115. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (explaining how the Supreme Court still
"continue[s] to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion").
116. GARRY, supra note 110, at 56-57.
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1. Secular Legislative Purpose Prong
Typically, any secular purpose will suffice, as long as it is not "motivated
wholly by an impermissible purpose.""' 7 However, in McCreary County v. ACLU,
the Supreme Court restricted Lemon's traditional deferential view of secular
purpose."8 According to Justice Scalia's dissent, the decision altered the first
prong from "actual purpose," to purpose apparent to an "objective observer";
thus, McCreary lessened the deference normally afforded to secular
governmental purposes." 9 In determining the purpose apparent to an objective
observer, the McCreary Court looked at the history of the challenged display as
well.,20
Approved book lists have the legitimate secular purpose of preventing
violence; however, this may not be their only purpose. A reasonable observer
may view an enumerated approved religious book list as having the additional
purpose of promoting those religions on the list, while disapproving of those not
on the list.' 2' Despite this alternative purpose, a court is unlikely to find an
approved book list to be motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose, because
the prevention of violence is considered a compelling interest.'22 The history of
approved book lists reveals that they were motivated in large part by a desire to
prevent violence.12 Approved book lists may have an alternative purpose of
ensuring reliable teachings, but the Establishment Clause "does not require that
the law's purpose be unrelated to religion."' Thus, an approved book list would
pass the secular purpose prong of the altered Lemon analysis.
117. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1998) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680
(1984)).
118. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (involving a Ten Commandment display that was
found to violate the Establishment Clause).
119. Id. at 900-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The] inquiry focuses not on the actual purpose of
government action, but the 'purpose apparent' from government action. Under this approach, even if a
government could show that its actual purpose was not to advance religion, it would presumably violate the
Constitution as long as the Court's objective observer would think otherwise.").
120. E.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (discussing the Court's past treatment of Sunday closure
laws and whether the purposes behind such laws were secular or religious); see also Ducoat, supra note 113, at
24 ("The history of a challenged display is helpful in determining purpose because it would be contrary to
common sense to assume an objective observer does not take into account the history of a display when she
observes it.").
121. Id. at 883-84 (explaining how the purpose behind the government's display was relevant because it
conveyed a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer).
122. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 ("The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the
ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute
or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations."); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725
n. 13 (2005) ("It bears repetition however, that prison security is a compelling state interest, and that deference is
due to institutional officials' expertise in this area.").
123. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10 (stating that the purpose of the SCLP was to limit access to
materials that could "discriminate, disparage, advocate violence or radicalize").
124. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (2007) (explaining that a law can have religious
purposes as well since anything otherwise would "amount to a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups").
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2. Effects Prong
Currently, the elements of the effects prong are whether the government
action (1) results in governmental indoctrination; (2) defines its recipients by
reference to religion; or (3) creates excessive entanglement between religion and
government.'25 Ultimately, all of these elements violate Lemon's effects prong
because they have the impermissible effect of advancing or endorsing religion.
26
In the specific context of aid to religious schools, programs do not have the
effect of endorsing religion when the aid is "allocated on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria" that do not favor or disfavor religion because the aid is made
available "on a nondiscriminatory basis.' ' 27 According to this definition, an
approved religious book list has an impermissible discriminatory effect because it
actively excludes religions and certain religious teachings. 28 Unless all religions
are represented on a list, an approved book list will inevitably discriminate
against those left off.
Additionally, the composition of approved book lists, such as the SCLP, is
determined by assuring that the items on the list provide 'reliable teachings as
determined by reliable subject experts." ' 2 9 Thus, the use of approved lists
impermissibly advances particular religious beliefs over others on the basis of
reliability or approval by the government.'3 ° The effects prong of the altered
Lemon analysis forbids this kind of interaction between the government and
religion, since it results in excessive entanglement by favoring reliable religious
teachings over supposedly unreliable ones."'
Furthermore, this kind of in-depth look into a religion's tenets of faith fulfills
the definition of excessive governmental "entanglement" with religion."32
Typically, the level of entanglement permitted by the Establishment Clause for
the purpose of ensuring that government funds are not being used for religious
125. See Eicher, supra note 110, at 228 (explaining the findings of the Supreme Court's decision in
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
126. See id. (explaining that the main question posed by the second prong of the Lemon analysis is
"whether a program has the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion" (internal quotations
omitted)).
127. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
128. For example, the SCLP chooses to represent only twenty religions on its list. See Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002) ("This Court's jurisprudence makes clear that a government...
program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause if it is neutral with respect to
religion.").
129. Goodstein, Purging, supra note 10 (quoting the statement made by BOP spokeswoman Traci
Billingsley).
130. See Esbeck, supra note 99, at 373 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1981), which held that the Establishment Clause required
the government not to "act with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters").
131. See Jeremy T. Bunnow, Comment, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the Changing
Nature of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1133, 1157 (1998) (explaining how
entanglement becomes excessive when it has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion).
132. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (explaining how a certain amount of interaction between church and
state is inevitable, but excessive entanglement runs afoul of the Establishment Clause).
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purposes is less than "pervasive monitoring" of religious programs.'33 Thus, the
government is permitted to lightly monitor where and how funds or resources are
being used, but may not examine the reliability of religious teachings.'- For
approved book lists, the government must closely examine what a religion
teaches to determine what books are needed to practice that particular faith. Thus,
the government-religion interaction imposed by approved religious book lists is
much more than non-pervasive monitoring; it involves detailed investigation into
religion itself. This type of government involvement with religion violates the
Establishment Clause's prohibition against excessive entanglement.35
Ultimately, the effects prong of the altered Lemon test forbids either
discrimination or excessive governmental entanglement with religion because
both of these acts have the effect of endorsing religion.3 6 An approved religious
book list violates these prohibitions by favoring some religions or religious
teachings over others and by delving into the content of religious tenets.37
3. Coercion
In addition to the altered Lemon test, a court could also invalidate an
approved religious book list under the Establishment Clause's coercion test.
Although coercion is not the primary test used by courts, "the presence of
coercion simply provides an additional basis for finding a constitutional
violation, and, perhaps, for finding the violation especially egregious."'38 At a
minimum, the Supreme Court holds that the "'government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.""39
Because coercion exists where "the governmental action exert[s] substantial
pressure on the dissenters' decisionmaking process," one can make a strong
argument that approved book lists are coercive. 40 Furthermore, if the choice
exercised by prisoners is not "true and private," impermissible coercion exists.'
4
'
Nothing alters a person's choices more than removing previously available
options entirely. A prisoner's commitment to faith is "one of 'the most intimate
133. Bunnow, supra note 131, at 1157-58 (explaining how the Supreme Court in Agostini kept the
pervasive monitoring factor for determining when there is excessive entanglement).
134. Cf Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976) (finding no excessive
entanglement where the State conducted annual audits to ensure that state money was not being used to teach
religion).
135. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 (including the definition of recipients by reference to religion and
excessive governmental entanglement as having the effect of advancing religion).
136. Id.
137. See Esbeck, supra note 99, at 368 (explaining how "the no-establishment principal has real bite
when it comes to keeping government from favoring one religion over another, or from being actively involved
in specifically religious matters").
138. CONKLE, supra note 109, at 122.
139. Eicher, supra note 110, at 228 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
140. CONKLE, supra note 109, at 122.
141. Fields, supra note 108, at 560 (explaining Justice O'Connor's position that "true and private
choices can only be made when there are genuine options" and a genuine option exists when "there is an
'adequate substitute' for the religious option in the eyes of the relevant actor").
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and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, [a choice] central to
personal dignity and autonomy." 4' Thus, a prisoner's decisionmaking process is
severely altered when he or she is told what religious materials he or she is
allowed to choose. 43 Although the government could argue that prisoners can
still choose among the books provided on an approved list, or keep those beliefs
that they already possess, any pressure on prisoners' religious choices, no matter
how subtle, constitutes coercion.'"4 Additionally, the effect of prison officials'
ability to disapprove of an inmate's religious choices is much more than subtle,
considering the fact that the level of "coercion that [already] exists in the life of
the prison inmate"' 45 If a public library chooses to limit its collection, citizens can
obtain books elsewhere, but if a prison limits the religious materials available to
prisoners, then they have no other means of obtaining them.' 6 Ultimately, the
kind of coercion imposed by the use of approved religious book lists in prison
violates the Establishment Clause.
D. Result: Unlike an Approved Book List, a Restricted Book List Does Not
Violate the Establishment Clause
As discussed above, an approved book list would not pass constitutional
standards imposed by either the effects prong of the altered Lemon test or the
coercion test. However, a restricted book list has significant differences from an
approved list that enable it to pass constitutional muster under the Establishment
Clause: first, a restricted book list would not utilize a list of approved religions;
second, a restricted book list would not discriminate between religions on the
basis of reliability or governmental approval; and lastly, a restricted book list
would not conduct an in-depth analysis of religious tenets. The only
discrimination performed by restricted book lists is between those books that do
and do not have the potential to incite violence. Ultimately, these differences are
crucial because they allow the use of restricted book lists to pass Establishment
Clause analysis by not discriminating between religions17 and by focusing on
violence rather than the reliability of religious content.'48
142. Seymour, supra note 22, at 557 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
143. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (explaining that school voucher
programs do not violate the Establishment Clause when parents are free to choose any school without any
interference or coercion from the government); Eicher, supra note 110, at 231 ("[T]he court may find that any
government-sponsored coercion is tempered by the intercession of private choice.").
144. Eicher, supra note 110, at 228-29 ('"[Peer] pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as
any overt compulsion."' (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)).
145. Id.
146. This Comment assumes that if a book is forbidden from a prison chapel library, then the prison will
also forbid a prisoner to obtain a copy for their private use because of the supposed danger that the book
imposes.
147. See Esbeck, supra note 99, at 387-88 (explaining how "[t]o permit government to favor one
religion tends to establish that religion" and how the "[g]overnment may not utilize classifications based on
denominational or sectarian affiliation").
148. Id. at 368.
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V. ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR A RESTRICTED BOOK LIST
Despite the fact that prisons' use of restricted book lists fulfills RLUIPA and
Establishment Clause requirements, a restricted list still needs to pass some
additional hurdles. A restricted book list may limit a prisoner's First Amendment
freedom of speech rights. 49 The Supreme Court has consistently held, in a variety
of contexts, that 'the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas.""'  Even more specifically, the Supreme Court has held that "[i]nmates
have the right to send and receive information."'' Thus, although prisoners are
not the ones speaking, they still have a right to receive the information they read
in books under the First Amendment.
5 2
However, as discussed earlier, the constitutional rights of prisoners are more
limited than those of the general populace. '3
"A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to
prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests
must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the
corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been
committed in accordance with due process of law."'
54
Prison is one of the few contexts in which courts perform extreme institutional
tailoring of free speech rights.'55 Courts tailor prisoners' free speech rights by
applying the Turner four-part test, which upholds restrictions on prisoners'
constitutional rights when they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological
149. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.").
150. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (quoting
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In Pico, the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional rights of
public school children to access to books banned from the school library and how .'[t]he right of freedom of
speech and press ... embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it."'
Id. (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
151. See Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 948, 954
(2007) (emphasis added) (explaining the holding of Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)).
152. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (explaining how the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas).
153. See supra Part 1; see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) ("[T]he Constitution
sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere.").
154. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quoting Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
155. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2007) (stating that "courts
allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government officials" in the contexts of public schools,
workplaces, and prisons).
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interests."' 156 An evaluation of the Turner test, as applied to restricted book lists, is
helpful to determine the legal requirements for restricted book lists."'
In addition to the Turner test, an evaluation of Brandenburg v. Ohio's' s
incitement test may also be helpful to determine which standards prison officials
should use to adequately determine whether a book poses enough of a danger to
prison security to justify its restriction.
A. Legal Requirements for Restricted Book Lists Under Turner
1. Thornburgh v. Abbott'59
Thornburgh v. Abbott application of Turner is useful for examining the
Supreme Court's analysis of freedom of speech deprivations in prisons.' 6 The
deprivation in Thornburgh was substantially similar to a restricted book list. The
restriction banned the possession of outside publications that the warden
determined to be "detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the
institution.'0 6' The warden used a nonexhaustive list of criteria to justify the
restriction of a publication. 62 This list included criteria such as: "describes
procedures for the construction or use of weapons," "encourages activities which
may lead to the use of physical violence or group disruption," and "encourages or
instructs in the commission of criminal activity.' ' 63 The Supreme Court stated
that there was "little doubt" that the kind of censorship imposed by the prison
would constitute First Amendment violations outside the prison gates.
' 64
However, the Court explained that the proper inquiry in the prison context was
whether the speech restrictions were 'reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. ' ' 61 More specifically, the Court utilized Turner's four
156. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
157. See Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court's "Prisoner Dilemma": How Johnson, RLUIPA, and
Cutter Re-Defined Inmate Constitutional Claims, 86 NEB. L. REV. 279, 282 (2007) ("Turner is a comprehensive
test ... and it remains the most fitting standard for inmate constitutional claims."). Commentary on the recent
case, Beard v. Banks, states that the Turner factors are no longer as useful for evaluation of prison regulations
justified by a rehabilitation rationale, but still find them to be applicable to regulations justified by a security
rationale. See Stanley Wu, Persona Non Grata in the Courts: The Disappearance of Prisoners' First
Amendment Constitutional Rights in Beard v. Banks, 28 WHITrIER L. REV. 981, 1006 (2007) ( "A rehabilitation
rationale . . . is too broad to adequately justify under the Turner factors without twisting both facts and logic to
make it fit.").
158. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
159. Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
160. See generally MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 5:2 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that
Thornburgh is one of three Supreme Court cases that best describe the test for prisoner's First Amendment free
speech claims).
161. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404. However, the regulation also stated that the warden could not reject a
publication "solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its
content is unpopular or repugnant." Id. at 405.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 405 n.5.
164. Id. at 407.
165. Id. at 404 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
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factors to uphold the restrictions on the prisoners' freedom of speech.' 66
Ultimately, the Court was persuaded by the fact that "the prison had a thorough
screening process that only excluded certain publications that would 'create an
intolerable risk of disorder under the conditions of a particular prison at a
particular time."",167 Because the deprivation in Thornburgh is similar to a
restricted book list, the following discussion will use Thornburgh's Turner
analysis and apply it to the use of restricted religious book lists in prisons.
a. First Factor: Legitimate and Neutral Governmental Objectives with
Regulations that Are Rationally Related to Those Objectives
The Court in Thornburgh analyzed the first Turner factor by determining
whether the prison regulation was supported by a (1) legitimate and (2) neutral
governmental objective and whether the regulation was rationally related to that
objective.'68 The Supreme Court found "[t]he legitimacy of the Government's
purpose in promulgating these regulations [to be] beyond question," because
"[t]he regulations [were] expressly aimed at protecting prison security, a purpose
[the] Court has said is 'central to all other corrections goals."' 6 9 Therefore, it is
equally apparent that a restricted book list would forward a legitimate
governmental purpose of protecting prison security.
It is also important to ask whether the regulation "'operated in a neutral
fashion, without regard to the content of the expression."' 70 Neutrality existed in
Thornburgh because the prison banned items "solely on the basis of their
potential implications for prison security," rather than a desire to suppress a
particular doctrine."' Thus, as long as a prison chooses to restrict religious books
solely on the basis of their violent content, rather than their objectionable
religious content, the restriction will be neutral.
A regulation can be rationally related to a prison's security objectives even
when it affords broad discretion to the warden.7 7 The Court in Thornburgh found
it "rational for prison officials to exclude materials which, although not
necessarily 'likely' to lead to violence, are determined to create an intolerable
risk of disorder."'73 In addition to the legitimacy of broad discretion, the Supreme
Court was also "comforted by the individualized nature of the determinations
required by the regulation."'7 4 Therefore, to be rationally related to security
166. Id. at 414-19.
167. Wu, supra note 157, at 999 (quoting Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417).
168. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414.
169. Id. at 415 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)).
170. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
171. MUSHLIN, supra note 160, § 5:2 (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415).
172. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416 ("[T]he broad discretion accorded prison wardens by the regulations
here at issue is rationally related to security interests.").
173. Golden v. McCaughtry, 937 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at
417).
174. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416.
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interests, a restricted book list should be composed by looking at each book
individually to determine if it creates "an intolerable risk of disorder."'' 5
b. Second Factor: Alternative Means of Exercising the Right
In Thornburgh, "the regulation still permitted an inmate to possess a broad
range of publications," thus alternative means were readily available.'7 6 The
Supreme Court only seems to find a regulation to violate Turner's second prong
when the regulation completely denies a right, leaving "no alternative means of
exercising the right."'' 77 Therefore, a restricted book list would fulfill this second
prong of the Turner test by leaving a wide-range of religious books available to
prisoners. 7 1 More specifically, a restricted book list should not categorically ban
material on a particular religion or religious theory, because such a restriction
would constitute a complete denial.
c. Third Factor: Impact that Accommodation of the Asserted
Constitutional Right Will Have on Others in the Prison
Thornburgh found that the right to possess publications that pose a threat to
security could only be protected "at the cost of significantly less liberty and
safety for everyone else, guards and prisoners alike." For this reason, "courts
should defer to the 'informed discretion of corrections officials."" 79  In
Thornburgh, the fear was that the violent material would circulate, creating a
dangerous "ripple effect."'' s In the case of restricted religious book lists for prison
libraries, the violent material is already in circulation and accessible to every
prisoner. Thus, according to the logic of Thornburgh, restricting violent books in
prison chapel libraries is permissible, because doing otherwise could have a
potentially negative impact on prison security as a whole.'8 '
175. Id. at 417.
176. Keegan, supra note 157, at 343. But cf. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532 (2006) (explaining that
the prison regulation involved failed Turner's second prong by providing "no alternative means of exercising
the right," since the high security prisoners had absolutely no right to possess the restricted materials).
177. Keegan, supra note 157, at 280-81 (explaining Beard, 548 U.S. 521, where the regulation
completely denied possession of non-religious publications, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), where
the regulation completely denied prisoners the right to marry).
178. See Seymour, supra note 22, at 540 (Turner's second prong allows administrators to "impose
restrictions on specific opportunities to practice the right in question as long as there is some other opportunity
to practice that right").
179. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
180. Id.; see also Rice v. State, 95 P.3d 994, 1010 (Kan. 2004) (stating that when accommodations
create ripple effects, courts should be 'particularly deferential to the inforned discretion of corrections
officials"' (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90)).
181. See also Beard, 548 U.S. at 532 (holding that a prison restriction passed Turner's third prong
because "were prison authorities to seek to 'accomodat[e] ... the asserted constitutional right,' the resulting
'impact' would be negative" (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90)).
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d. Fourth Factor: Existence of Obvious, Easy Alternatives
If an inmate can point to "an alternative that fully accommodates the
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests," then there is
evidence that the regulation is an "exaggerated response," rather than rationally
related to those interests. 1 2 The only alternative offered in Thornburgh was to
tear out or remove the objectionable parts from the publications. 3 The Court
rejected this alternative due to fear that doing so would create more discontent
than the current practice.' 4 Additionally, the Court rejected the alternative due to
its "administrative inconvenience."'85 The only likely alternative available to
restricting an objectionable book in its entirety would be to excise the violent
content. Prison officials could easily counter this alternative by relying on
Thornburgh's assertion that editing out portions from publications cannot be
performed at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. s6
As demonstrated above, a restricted book list would pass Turner's four
factors in a manner similar to how the ban on outside publications did in
Thornburgh. Although a restricted book list passes this part of the constitutional
analysis, a legal standard must still be explored for how to determine if a book is
sufficiently dangerous to be restricted under Brandenburg's incitement test.
B. Legal Requirements for Restricted Book Lists Under the Brandenburg
Incitement Test
The Supreme Court was careful to point out in Thornburgh that "a
reasonableness standard is not toothless."'87 Therefore, prison officials should not
justify restricting books by merely stating that they could cause violence or create
a safety threat. 1 8 Instead, prison officials need to use more clear and articulable
standards to restrict books. It is for this reason that a book's ability to incite
violence should also be examined under the Brandenburg v. Ohio'89 test altered
for the prison situation.
The Brandenburg incitement test is "widely understood as establishing the
prevailing First Amendment test to be applied in cases involving incitement to
182. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
183. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418-19.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 419.
186. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
187. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414; see Keegan, supra note 157, at 330 ("The prongs from Turner
effectively 'ramp up' what is otherwise labeled a 'reasonableness' test.").
188. See Application to Incarcerated Persons-Inmate Access to Print Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 263,
272 (2006) (arguing that the proper approach should be to "conduct a more searching inquiry into the
connection between the ends and means, requiring evidence-not mere assertions-from prison officials
supporting the claim that certain policies are necessary for security").
189. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that a broadcast of a Ku Klux Klan rally was
protected speech since the government cannot punish mere advocacy which does not rise to the level of
incitement to imminent lawless action).
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violence."' 9 Traditionally, the original Brandenburg test had three requirements:
"(1) intent ... ; (2) imminence ... ; and (3) likelihood ... 'to incite or produce
[violent] action."" 9' However, these three elements do not apply to every
situation. Some scholars argue that "[ilt is not at all certain that existing First
Amendment theory and doctrine require a mechanical application of
Brandenburg to [every] fact pattern."'' 92 This is particularly the case when the
doctrine is used to vindicate values that are "in tension with other social interests
in other contexts," such as security needs in prisons.' 93 Because a mechanical
application of Brandenburg's factors is not appropriate in the prison setting,
some other Brandenburg formulation should be utilized.
94
The first change to the traditional Brandenburg test (to better fit it to the
prison context) is to remove the intent requirement. The purpose of the intent
requirement is to assign liability to producers of violent speech in order to punish
them for any injury that results.'95 This kind of intent does not apply to restricted
book lists because the government is not seeking to punish the publishers of
violent books; instead, the government seeks to prevent prisoners from reading
them.
Secondly, because the court generally yields great deference to the security
determinations of prison officials, Brandenburg's imminence requirement should
be reduced to a lower threshold than immediate danger due to the fact that prison
officials "must be permitted to act before the time when they can compile a
dossier on the eve of a riot."' 196 Therefore, instead of imminence, a Brandenburg
analysis in the prison context should require a showing of potential for violent
results, according to the informed discretion of prison officials.' 97
Thirdly, the likelihood prong of the Brandenburg test should remain largely
the same in the prison context. In application, this third prong "mean[s] simply
that it is more probable than not that violence will ensue as a result" of the
speech.' 98 This likelihood increases in the prison context where a large number of
individuals, many with violent tendencies, have ready access to an objectionable
190. Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort
Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000).
191. See id. at 10 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447) (describing the three prongs of the
Brandenburg test).
192. Id. at 11.
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. at 12 ("Because free speech issues arise in an extraordinarily wide range of circumstances and
settings, the Supreme Court has not attempted to jam all free speech analysis into the 'incitement' standard of
Brandenburg, but rather has employed Brandenburg-style analysis in cases dealing with Brandenburg-like
settings.").
195. See generally Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (imposing tort liability on the
publisher of a book that described, in detail, how to become a professional hit man, after a man used the book to
carry out a contract killing of a woman, her disabled son, and his nurse).
196. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977).
197. See id. ("The informed discretion of prison officials that there is potential danger may be
sufficient.").
198. Smolla, supra note 190, at 10.
2009 / Battle of the Lists
book.' 9 Ultimately, as long as a prison official, in his or her informed discretion,
can reasonably articulate why it is more probable than not that one prisoner
would be incited to violence by the objectionable material, this prong is met.
Ultimately, the legal requirements for a restricted religious book list center
around reasonableness. Turner requires a reasonable relation to a legitimate
penological interest2" and Brandenburg requires a reasonable determination that
the book in question has the potential to incite violence. °' Courts have
consistently provided wide discretion to the security determinations of prisons,
except in unique instances. 23 Therefore, in composing a restricted religious book
list, prison officials should be afforded the traditional deference from courts, if
they can demonstrate that reasonable steps were taken 2°' to ensure that only books
posing a "potential danger" to security were restricted.2 5
VI. CONCLUSION
As stated in the beginning of this Comment, prison officials constantly
perform a balancing act between the need to protect security interests and the
need to uphold prisoners' constitutional rights. 206 Both restricted and approved
lists implicate this balancing test by limiting prisoners' access to religious
materials in the name of security. However, restricted lists do so in a less
invasive and unnecessary way. Restricted lists ban only those books that do more
harm than good. Approved lists ban access to all books except those specifically
approved by administrators on the basis of their religious content. Despite the
narrowing of prisoners' constitutional rights, courts have consistently held that
199. Cf id. at 12 (explaining that if the focus is on one reader, then the likelihood is remote, but the
likelihood increases the larger the audience).
200. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
201. See, e.g., Jones, 433 U.S. at 126 ("State correctional officials uniformly testified that the [restricted
activity at issue] was itself fraught with potential dangers.").
202. See Keegan, supra note 157, at 280 (explaining how the Supreme Court has "consistently held firm
on two propositions," one being that "corrections officials should be granted deference when dealing with the
difficult task of running a prison").
203. See id. at 281 (explaining how two recent developments have broken away from deferential review
by mandating that prisons' short-term race-based classifications must be evaluated under strict scrutiny,
following Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), and by imposing strict scrutiny for prison regulations
that limit prisoners' First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion); see also Trevor N. McFadden, Note,
When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court's Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 J.L. & POL. 135, 136
(2006) ("[T]he Court declined to use the deferential Turner test for analyzing racial classifications.").
204. See Jones, 433 U.S. at 132-33 ("Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable
steps to forestall such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the time when they can compile a
dossier on the eve of a riot.").
205. See id. at 133 n.9 ("The informed discretion of prison officials that there is potential danger may be
sufficient for limiting rights even though this showing might be 'unimpressive if... submitted as justification
for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public."' (quoting Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825 (1974)).
206. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
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the prison gates do not remove all constitutional protections.207 Safety concerns
must still be given due deference in the prison context, but not without upholding
the constitutional rights of prisoners. Ultimately, restricted lists best serve the
dual function of providing prisoners with the ability to choose how, and with
what materials, to practice their faith, while adequately meeting the security
needs of prisons. °s
207. Steven Goldberg, Cutter and the Preferred Position of the Free Exercise Clause, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1403, 1412 (2006) ("While the Court consistently has said that prisoners are not shorn of their
constitutional rights, it just as consistently has said that those rights are defined and limited by the prison
setting.").
208. One aspect of restricted book lists that this Comment has chosen not to address is the burden that
creating a restricted list will impose on prison administrators. The BOP cited such burdens as their reason for
abandoning its inventory of all objectionable books in the first place. It is the position of this Comment that the
use of any list, restricted or approved, will incur some burdens, because a review of a large subset of literature
will need to be conducted. However, the constitutional rights of prisoners ultimately trump any additional
burdens that a restricted list may incur.

